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TOWARD A PARENT-INCLUSIVE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
Sande L. Buhai*
Few state or federal courts recognize a parent-child
testimonial or communication privilege. Yet, courts
recognize privileges between spouses, clergy-penitent,
and therapist-patient. Supported by the Wigmore test
that legitimized these privileges, this paper argues that
the attorney-client privilege should still exist even if (1)
a client’s parent is included in an attorney-client
meeting in an advisory capacity; (2) the child discloses
contents of the attorney-client communications to the
child’s parent; or (3) the child discusses the contents of
the attorney-client communications with the child’s
parent.

* Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank the
school for its on-going support for scholarship and her research assistants, Susan Perez and
Carla Acebo, for their hard work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Jane, an eighteen-year-old college freshman who has never
previously been away from home, is sexually assaulted in her dorm.
When she reports the assault to law enforcement, she is
interrogated for three hours about her past sexual history and then
released. She calls her mom, sobbing. Her mom drives all night to
be with her daughter. The next day, they retain an attorney.
“Sorry,” he says, “you cannot sit in on my meeting with your
daughter. For me to allow you to do so would waive the attorneyclient privilege. What’s more, she cannot talk with you about
anything she and I discuss at that meeting. Doing so might also
waive the privilege.” Jane is devastated yet again. She has always
relied on her mother’s counsel and support, and has never needed it
more than today. She must now face the ordeal of a hostile legal
system alone.
Modern American law recognizes several types of privileged
communications:
attorney-client,
marital,
clergy-penitent,
physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, and, in a few states,
parent and minor child.1 Each form of privilege is an exception to
the principle famously articulated by the Duke of Argyll in 1742 and
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Bryan—“the public has a claim to every man’s evidence” to
determine the truth.2 Exceptions are justified and their scope
determined by what has come to be known as the Wigmore test,
under which communications must meet four conditions to be
considered privileged:
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed;
(2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
1 See Note, Parent-Child Loyalty & Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 911–12
(1987) (discussing the privileges that courts have recognized).
2 12 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 675 (T.C. Hansard 1812).
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(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.3
Citing the Wigmore test, commentators have repeatedly urged
adoption of parent-child privileges similar to the privileges that
protect communications between spouses,4 for the most part to no
avail.5 In 2005, Congress considered H.R. 3433, the Parent-Child
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 8, § 8 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
See, e.g., Daniel R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and
Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 622–32 (1970) (arguing that communication within the
child-parent relationship generally satisfies the Wigmore test); Maureen P. O’Sullivan, An
Examination of the State and Federal Courts’ Treatment of the Parent-Child Privilege, 39
CATH. LAW. 201, 206 (2017) (“[T]he parent-child privilege should become pervasive law in the
United States.”); David A. Schlueter, The Parent-Child Privilege: A Response to Calls for
Adoption, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 35, 45 (1987) (“[V]irtually every commentator addressing the
issue has urged either legislative or judicial adoption a parent-child privilege.” (citations
omitted)); Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or
Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 608 (1987) (“[T]he proposed parent-child
confidential communications privilege satisfies each condition of the Wigmore test.”); Yolanda
L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or Not To Tell? An Analysis of Testimonial
Privileges: The Parent-Child and Reporter's Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 163,
172 (1993) (“After examining the issue in light of Wigmore’s postulate, the parent-child
privilege should undoubtedly be accepted because it satisfies each condition of the Wigmore
test.”); Jeffrey Begens, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Absolute Right or
an Absolute Privilege?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 709, 723 (1986) (“Recognition of a parent-child
privilege should result when applying . . . [the] Wigmore standard.”); Betsy Booth, Comment,
Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36
SW. L.J. 1175, 1177 (1983) (“The proposed privilege for confidential communications between
parent and child arguably satisfies Dean Wigmore’s four criteria, and thus merits recognition
as a rule of evidence.”); Jennifer A. Clark, Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child
Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142, 150 (1980) (“[T]he proposed parent-child privilege
. . . meets the four criteria established by Dean Wigmore . . . .”); J. Tyson Covey, Note, Making
Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and Applying a Statutory Parent-Child
Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 881–82 (1990) (articulating the Wigmore test in a
discussion concerning whether Illinois should create a parent-child privilege); Gregory W.
Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of the Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Too Big
for its Britches?, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 168 (1984) (“Courts should not compel disclosure
of confidential communications between minors and their parents concerning matters of
guidance and support. This conclusion is consistent . . . with the Wigmore formula . . . .”); cf.
Nissa M. Ricafort, Note, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court’s Dramatic Shift Supports
the Recognition of a Federal Parent-Child Privilege, 32 IND. L. REV. 259, 294–95 (1998)
(arguing that to recognize a parent-child privilege, courts should abandon the Wigmore test
in favor of a more flexible approach). But see Jessica L. Perry, Parent-Child Privilege, 36
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 143, 146 (1998) (noting that the Third Circuit has held that a parentchild relationship does not satisfy the Wigmore criteria).
5 See infra Part II.E.
3
4
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Privilege Act,6 which proposed to amend Article V of the Federal
Rules of Evidence by adding a new Rule 502. This new evidence
rule would have recognized both an adverse testimonial privilege
and a confidential communications privilege between parent and
child, regardless of whether the child had reached the age of
majority.7 Viewed as overbroad,8 the proposed Act died in the
House.
This paper proposes a more narrowly tailored solution than what
was proposed in H.R. 3433 or by past commentators. Specifically,
this paper proposes an expansion of the Wigmore test in three
narrow circumstances. Attorney-client privilege should still exist if
(1) a client’s parent is included in an attorney-client meeting in an
advisory capacity; (2) the child discloses contents of the attorneyclient communications to the child’s parent; or (3) the child
discusses the contents of the attorney-client communications with
the child’s parent. The attorney-client privilege should not be
deemed waived in any of the three situations above, so long as the
relevant communications are not disclosed to anyone else.

6
Parent-Child Privilege Act of 2005, H.R. 3433, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). Similar proposals
made by earlier sessions of Congress include the Parent-Child Privilege Act of 1998, H.R.
4286, 105th Cong. (1998), and the Parent-Child Privilege Act of 1999, H.R. 522, 106th Cong.
(1999).
7 The latter would have protected the

[C]ommunication between a parent and the parent’s child, made privately or
solely in the presence of other members of the child’s family or an attorney,
physician, psychologist, psychotherapist, social worker, clergy member, or
other third party who has a confidential relationship with the parent or the
child, which is not intended for further disclosure except to other members
of the child’s family or household or to other persons in furtherance of the
purposes of the communication.
H.R. 3433, § 2(a), proposed Rule 502(a)(2). For purposes of the proposed rule, the term “child”
was defined to include:
[T]he son, daughter, stepchild, or foster child of a parent or the ward of a
legal guardian or of any other person who serves as the child’s parent . . .
irrespective of whether or not [the person who meets this definition] has
attained the age of majority in the place in which that person resides.
Id., proposed Rule 502(a)(1).
8 Cf. 144 CONG. REC. H1407–1430 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998) (collecting statements of Reps.
Coble, Frank, and Hyde with regard to the 1998 proposal).
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Unlike H.R. 3433, this paper does not propose a general
testimonial privilege or confidential-communications privilege
between parent and child. Nor does it advocate a reciprocal childinclusive privilege, which might allow children to become privy to
their parents’ attorney-client confidential matters. This paper’s
proposal is designed solely to allow parents to help their young adult
children navigate a legal system that can intimidate the best of us.
In jurisdictions that have chosen or ultimately choose to adopt
broader parent-child privileges, the proposed rule complements
such privileges. Nevertheless, recognition of a general parent-child
privilege is not a prerequisite to adoption of the rule proposed here.
A parent-inclusive attorney-client privilege not restricted to
children of a particular age would allow parents to assist their adult
children of whatever age who are not capable of navigating the legal
system by themselves. Should an age limitation make the proposal
more acceptable, however, modern developmental psychology
suggests that a cut-off in the mid-twenties—for example, a rule
applicable only if the child is age twenty-five or younger—might be
appropriate.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II explores the Wigmore test
to justify and shape currently recognized communication privileges.
The same rationale that applies to existing privileges applies
equally to the limited expansion of the attorney-client privilege for
which this paper advocates. Part III explores the problem of waiver.
Part IV then argues in favor of a limited expansion of the attorneyclient privilege—to make it parent-inclusive. This limited expansion
is justified given both the role of the attorney and modern evidence
regarding the developmental capacity and decision-making abilities
of adult children. Part V explores another alternative sometimes
used in cases involving minor children—treating the parent as
agent of the child. While plausible, a solution founded in the law of
agency is problematic, and a parent-inclusive attorney-client would
avoid these problems. Part VI concludes.
II. COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGES UNDER THE WIGMORE TEST
A. A BRIEF HISTORY

During a 1742 debate in the House of Lords, the Duke of Argyll
famously stated that “the public has a claim to every man’s
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evidence” in order to determine the truth.9 Even before the Duke
announced this principle, English courts had held that certain types
of communications were privileged, and therefore immune from
discovery or disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that they might be
of value to the truth-seeking process.10 Historically, such commonlaw privileges were limited to communications of a kind deemed
specially worthy of protection because of the close and sensitive
relationship between the parties to the communications.11
Before recognizing categorical communication privileges, courts
made case-by-case determinations of the need for privacy by
balancing the “validity of the right sought and the ‘need’ for
protection against society’s interest in ascertaining the truth.”12
Privilege was recognized only in cases in which the court found that
“the privacy interest outweighed society’s interest.”13 Over time,
however, the law of privilege evolved into a series of per se rules,
applied without need for ex post case-by-case balancing.14 Under a
per se approach, parties could rely on the existence of such privileges
in their day-to-day dealings without having to risk an after-the-fact
judicial determination that, on their particular facts, society’s
interest outweighed their interest in privacy.
The law of privilege has continued to evolve in the modern era
through both judicial and legislative action. Prior to 1975, no federal
statutory scheme addressed the question; federal courts therefore
relied on Anglo-American common law.15 In 1975, Congress enacted

COBBETT, supra note 2, at 675.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 2290 (John T. Mcnaughton Rev. 1961) (English courts
recognized a form of the modern attorney-client privilege as early as 1577).
11 See Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement
Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New
Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 260–61 (2005) (“[Prior to 1975], the only privileges
consistently respected were the attorney-client, spousal, governmental secrets, and voting
privileges.”).
12 Privileges, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://www.epic.org/privacy/privileges (last
visited Nov. 4, 2018).
13 Id.
14 See Steven Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, The Battle to Define the Scope of Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Context of Insurance Company Bad Faith: A Judicial War Zone, 14 U.N.H. L.
REV. 105, 106 (2015) (arguing that courts have adopted the “functional equivalent of a per se
waiver rule” for privilege in the context of insurance company bad faith).
15 See Privileges, supra note 12 (explaining that the early American legal system looked to
English common law for foundation principles of privilege).
9

10
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Federal Rule of Evidence 501 validating this practice. In its original
version, the Rule provided that
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.16
In the years following the implementation of Rule 501, there was
some initial uncertainty as to whether and to what extent courts
could create or modify privileges under the Rule.17 Yet in 1996, the
Supreme Court recognized a new psychotherapist-patient privilege
in Jaffee v. Redmond.18 Since Jaffee, however, no federal court has
recognized another type of communication privilege.
Today, communication privileges remain limited to situations
involving relationships that meet the Wigmore test.19 Under that
test, communications made in confidence are not protected from

16 FED. R. EVID. 501 (1975) (amended 2011). Today’s Rule 501 is substantively identical.
It reads as follows:

The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of
reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the
following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense
for which state law supplies the rule of decision.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
17 Diane Marie Amann & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Supreme Court's Decision to
Recognize a Psychotherapist Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996): The
Meaning of “Experience” and the Role of “Reason” Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 65 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1031–32 (1997) (noting that the text of Rule 501 did not provide significant
clarity to courts as to what extent courts could create new privileges under Rule 501).
18 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) (“[W]e hold that confidential communications between a licensed
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from
compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
19 See supra Parts II.B—D.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 4

1000

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:991

disclosure simply because of their confidential nature.20
Confidentiality protections only arise if “premised upon a public
policy expressed by statute or in furtherance of an overriding public
concern of constitutional dimension.”21 The primary reason for this
limitation is the fact that “privileges contravene the fundamental
principles that a public has a right to every person’s evidence.”22 In
addition to the most quintessential form of communication
privilege—the attorney-client privilege—courts now recognize
marital
privileges,
the
clergy-penitent
privilege,
and
psychotherapist-patient privilege.23 A minority of jurisdictions have
created a parent-minor child privilege, although the scope of this
privilege is far from certain.24 Each of the non-attorney-client
communication privileges supports this paper’s premise that a
parent-inclusive attorney-client relationship should be recognized.25
B. MARITAL PRIVILEGES

Marital privileges promote and encourage trust, candor, and
confidence between spouses and thereby foster and preserve the
marital relationship.26 The Supreme Court discussed the spousal
testimonial privilege in Trammel v. United States: “the modern
justification for this privilege . . . is its perceived role in fostering
the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”27 Two
distinct marital privileges exist and are sometimes confused: the
spousal testimonial privilege and the marital communications
privilege.28 Courts have noted that these “privileges should be

20 Kelly Korrell, Annotation, Testimonial Privilege for Confidential Communications
Between Relatives Other than Husband and Wife—State Cases, 62 A.L.R. 5th 629, § 2[a]
(1998).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 2017) (listing persons covered by
Colorado testimonial privileges).
24 See infra Part II.E.
25 For a discussion of the attorney-client privilege itself, see infra Part IV.
26 See Korrell, supra note 20 (explaining that the privilege is intended to promote
confidence between spouses and “aid in the preservation of the marriage status”).
27 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
28 Privileges, supra note 12.
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narrowly construed because they undermine the search for the
truth.”29
1. Spousal Testimonial Privilege
The spousal testimonial privilege entitles a spouse to refuse to
testify against their partner, regardless of whether communications
are involved.30 For example, testimony regarding the clothing the
witness’s spouse was wearing on the morning in question is
precluded. Communications are subject to the privilege as well.
Generally, the privilege arises upon marriage, and terminates upon
divorce.31 In effect, the testimonial privilege works as a complete bar
to testimony, regardless of subject matter, so long as the events in
question occurred during the marriage.32
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize some
form of spousal testimonial privilege.33 As with many of the
communication privileges, the structure and scope of the spousal
testimonial privilege varies from state to state.34 Seventeen states
have restricted the privilege to criminal cases; others recognize it in
both civil and criminal proceedings.35 In a majority of jurisdictions,
including the federal courts, the spousal testimonial privilege can
be waived by the witness spouse alone.36 Under this construction,
the defendant spouse cannot prevent the witness spouse from
testifying.37
It is not clear that an analogous parent-child testimonial
privilege is required to solve the problem this paper is trying to
29 State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (citing State v.
Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 820 (N.J. 1994)).
30 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:39, at
729 (3d ed. 2007). A minority of states have construed this privilege to allow one spouse to
prevent the testimony of their partner, but this is not the case under federal law. Id. at 729–
30.
31 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 81 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., Thomson/West 6th ed. 2006).
32 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, at 730..
33 Pamela A. Haun, Note, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM.
L. REV. 137, 158 (2001).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 158–59.
37 Id. at 158. A minority of states have applied one of two alternate constructions. One
view, held by approximately six states, grants the decision of whether the witness spouse may
testify to the defendant spouse instead. Id. at 159. Another view, held by three states, allows
either spouse to invoke the privilege. Id.
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solve—that of allowing parents to help their children navigate a
sometimes–hostile legal system. Therefore, unlike the Parent-Child
Privilege Act and the recommendations of many scholars, this paper
does not propose a testimonial bar that exists in the spousal
testimonial privilege.
2. Spousal Communications Privilege
The spousal communications privilege, by contrast, only prevents
testimony by a spouse with regard to confidential communications
made during the marriage.38 Consistent with the Wigmore test,
most states require that the communication must have been made
privately by one spouse to the other during the marriage and must
not have been intended for disclosure to any other person.39 To deter
people from entering marriage for the purpose of preventing
information from being discoverable, communications made prior to
marriage are generally not protected.40
This privilege is recognized by all U.S. jurisdictions, with the
possible exception of Connecticut.41 “All but a few states allow the
communications privilege to be invoked in both civil and criminal
proceedings.”42 Unlike the testimonial privilege, nearly all states
permit the non-witness spouse to invoke this privilege, although
there are some differences among the states regarding the rights of
the witness spouse.43
The proposed parent-inclusive attorney-client privilege,
although much narrower, is similar to the spousal communications
38 See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (“Communications between the
spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential, and
hence they are privileged; but, wherever a communication . . . was obviously not intended to
be confidential, it is not a privileged communication.”); see also Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (affirming the Wolfe presumption of confidentiality).
39 Haun, supra note 33, at 140. However, “conversations between married spouses are
presumptively confidential, and the party seeking disclosure has the burden of overcoming
the presumption.” 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, at § 5-40, 753 (citing Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954)).
40 See Steven N. Gofman, Note, Honey the Judge Says We’re History: Abrogating the
Marital Privileges via Modern Doctrines of Marital Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 843, 853–
54 (1992) (“[C]ourts and legislatures may deny the marital privileges to those marriages
entered into as a fraud on the court, for example, when the couple marries solely for the
purpose of raising marital privilege.”).
41 Haun, supra note 33, at 159.
42 Id. at 159–60.
43 See id. at 160–62 (discussing differences in states’ application of the privilege).
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privilege. Like the spousal privilege, the proposed privilege relates
to communications originally made in confidence, subject to the
condition that they not be disclosed. As is true in the case of the
spousal privilege, confidentiality is essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the advisory relationship between a
parent and the child and, indeed, of the relationship between the
child and the attorney. Although perhaps not given the
extraordinary esteem accorded by some to the marital relationship,
the advisory relationship between parent and child is almost
certainly one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
C. CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE

It is similarly well-settled that a communication between an
individual and a clerical or other spiritual adviser is protected—so
long as it was intended as confidential or regarded by the clergy
member as such.44 Historically, the privilege “dates back to preReformation Europe and the Roman Catholic Church’s canon law.”45
Catholics were then (and are still today) required to confess their
sins to a priest; their confessions were subject to the “seal of the
confessional,” which meant that under no circumstances, even if a
judge issued a court order, could a priest reveal what he had heard.46
A priest who disclosed the contents of a confession was subject to
excommunication.47
Today, all U.S. jurisdictions recognize the clergy-penitent
privilege.48 In general, “the privilege may be asserted by a
clergyperson or party in any legal proceeding, enabling the claimant
to refuse to testify without subjecting himself or herself to possible
sanctions by the court.”49 States vary as to who is regarded as the
holder of the privilege: some hold that the privilege belongs to the
penitent, not the clergy member;50 others hold that the privilege
44 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses §§ 466, 469–74 (2018) (describing the clergy-penitent
privilege and general requirements for it to apply).
45 Lori Lee Brocker, Sacred Secrets: The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Finds Its Way Into the
News, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1996, at 15.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 16.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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belongs to both the clergy member and the penitent—either may
therefore assert the privilege.51
In Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court opined that the
clergy-penitent privilege “recognizes the human need to disclose to
a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are
believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return.”52 Thus, in order to assert the
privilege, the penitent must show that the “information [was]
imparted in confidence and for the purposes of obtaining spiritual
guidance.”53
Due to the intimate and religious nature of the clergy-penitent
relationship, some even view the privilege as constitutionally
required, although the issue has never been tested.54 One scholar
described the underlying policy for this privilege as the recognition
that “American society recognizes that adherents of all religions
should feel free to seek spiritual advice and counseling from clergy
with the assurance that their communications will not be
disclosed.”55 As a result, courts and the public are both “generally
repulsed by the law’s intrusion into such an intimate
relationship.”56 A further problem arises from the fact that clergy
may believe themselves answerable to a higher authority than the
court and may therefore refuse to testify regardless of the
punishment a court threatens to impose for failing to do so.57
Practically, the clergy-penitent privilege “prevents embarrassment
to the judiciary.”58
The advisory relationship between parent and child may—in
many cases—resemble the clergy-penitent relationship. Children

Id.
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
53 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 471 (2018).
54 See James W. Hilliard, The Public’s Right to Evidence—Sometimes: The Clergy
Testimonial Privilege, 83 ILL. B.J. 182, 183 (1995) (“It has been argued that the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment prohibits government from compelling clergy to disclose
confidential communications . . . .”). But see id. (“However, commentators have not given this
theory great weight. The generally accepted view is that the privilege is probably not required
by the federal Constitution.”).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See id. (“Generally, clergy will refuse to testify, regardless of the punishment a court
may impose.”).
58 Id.
51
52
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seek their parents’ advice for many of the same reasons they seek
the advice of clergy. And like the priests who refuse to testify, it is
often the case that parents refuse to testify against their children
regardless of the punishment a court threatens to impose for failing
to do so. As the community does not blame either priests or parents
when they do not testify, both types of testimony seem to be the kind
of which the community seeks to sedulously foster.
D. THERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Jaffee v.
Redmond, all U.S. jurisdictions have come to recognize “some form
of evidentiary privilege for confidential statements by patients to
psychotherapists for the purpose of seeking treatment”59—for all the
reasons articulated by Wigmore.60
Arguably, recognition of this paper’s proposed parent-inclusive
attorney-client privilege is more clearly justified under the Wigmore
test than the therapist-patient privilege. Family is more central to
American culture and tradition than psychotherapy, lending
credence to the argument that it is at least as clear that the advisory
relationship between parent and child should be sedulously fostered
by both law and society.
Both relate to communications originally made in confidence,
subject to a condition that they not be disclosed. Confidentiality is
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of both the
therapist-patient relationship and the advisory participation of the
parent in the attorney-client relationship of his or her child. And in
each case, failure to recognize a privilege may leave the person from
whom testimony would otherwise be sought—parent or therapist—
ignorant of the relevant facts; failure to recognize a privilege may
therefore not advance the quest for truth at all.

59 George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 33 (1999).
60 Cf. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (“The attorney-client privilege
must necessarily protect the confidences of wrongdoers, but the reason for that protection—
the centrality of open client and attorney communication to the proper functioning of our
adversary system of justice—'ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely, where the desired
advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.’” (quoting 8 Wigmore, § 2298,
p. 573)).
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E. PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

1. Current Law
Few state or federal courts recognize any parent-child
testimonial or communication privilege.61 Statutes in Idaho and
Minnesota protect confidential communications made by minor
children to their parents.62 Massachusetts, by contrast, statutorily
prohibits an unemancipated minor child from testifying against his
or her custodial parent in any criminal proceeding in which the
victim was not a member of the household; it does not, however,
prohibit the parent from testifying against his or her child.63 New
York is the only state in which a parent-child privilege has been
recognized as a matter of common law,64 although the scope of the
privilege in that state remains unclear. A New York intermediate
appellate court first recognized the privilege in 1978 in In re A and
M,65 in which a prosecutor sought to force the parents of a 16-yearold boy to testify with regard to statements the boy had made to
them regarding the setting of a fire. The court noted that the boy
had made the statements while seeking guidance from his parents,
with the expectation that his communications would remain
confidential.66 The court reasoned that “[t]he role of the family,
particularly that of the mother and father, in establishing a child’s
emotional stability, character and self-image is universally
recognized.”67 The court also noted psychological and behavioral
science research that open communication was necessary to both
the parent-child relationship and to the child’s emotional
development.68 Following this reasoning, the court held that the
61 An excellent federal and 50-state review of the question as of November 2017 appears
in Sullivan, supra note 4.
62 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 1(j) (West 2013).
63 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (2018).
64 See, e.g., People v. Harrell, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (“[I]n certain
circumstances, [communications between parent and child] have been shielded from
inquiry.”); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 923 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (holding statements made
by defendant to grandmother, where grandmother was primary caregiver, to be protected by
a parent-child privilege); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1979)
(holding that parent-child privilege applied).
65 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
66 Id. at 378.
67 Id. at 432.
68 Id. (“The erosion of this influence would have a profound effect on the individual child
and on society as a whole. Child psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree that
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“communications made by a minor child to his parents within the
context of the family relationship may, under some circumstances,
lie within the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.”69
The parent-child privilege was extended by a New York trial
court the following year in People v. Fitzgerald, where a 23-year-old
made statements to his father regarding a hit-and-run car
accident.70 Citing In re A and M, Wigmore, and the federal and state
Constitutions, the court held “that a parent-child privilege does
exist in this State, flowing directly from such rights as are granted
by both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. . . which
have fostered the recognition of what has come to be known as the
‘right to privacy.’”71 The court opined that “the injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication [is]
greater than the benefit to be derived by the State in its disposal of
litigation.”72 As to whether the privilege should be limited to minor
children, the court reasoned:
Not only do logical, ethical and moral considerations
mandate the extension of such a fundamental right
beyond any arbitrary age, but if, as this Court believes,
such a parent-child “privilege” flows from the
constitutional right to privacy inherent in such a
relationship, the State is forbidden under law to create
such an artificial barrier as age to limit that right to
certain persons only, due to the ongoing nature of such
a relationship . . . No other previously recognized
privilege has as its basis a necessity of meeting a
minimum or maximum age. It is the nature of the

it is essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines of communication remain open
and that the child be encouraged to ‘talk out’ his problems. It is therefore critical to a child’s
emotional development that he know that he may explore his problems in an atmosphere of
trust and understanding without fear that his confidences will later be revealed to others.”).
69 Id. at 380 (internal quotations omitted). But see In re Mark G., decided the same year
as In re A and M, where the same court declined to consider statements not made in
confidence or for the purpose of obtaining guidance as privileged. See 410 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465–
66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
70 422 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
71 Id. at 312 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
72 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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relationship and the nature of the communication
which govern.73
No other reported New York decision has yet followed
Fitzgerald, and a few courts have scaled back the privilege for adult
children. In 1994, a memorandum decision in People v. Johnson by
the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, declined to extend
parent-child testimonial privilege to a twenty-eight year old
defendant who had a conversation with his mother about a crime he
committed against a family member.74 Four years later, a New York
trial court noted that “[a]lthough the Court of Appeals didn’t hold
that a parent-child privilege would never exist for an adult child,
that it considered the child’s age a factor in determining that no
privilege existed is significant in our analysis and surely not an
endorsement of the Fitzgerald holding.”75 It therefore rejected
Fitzgerald altogether.76
While the scope of the privilege afforded by New York may be
unclear, what is clear is that New York does not privilege
communications running from parent to child. In People v. Romer,77
a New York trial court rejected an attempted application of the
privilege to exclude a letter from father to son, distinguishing
Fitzgerald:
The Court in Fitzgerald, concerned that children in our
society may find themselves in a position where they
Id. at 314 (internal citations omitted).
644 N.E.2d 1378 (N.Y. 1994) (mem.) (“[A] parent-child testimonial privilege . . . would
not even arguably apply in that defendant was 28 years old at the time of the conversation
with his mother; another family member was present; the mother testified before the Grand
Jury hearing evidence against defendant; and the conversation concerned a crime committed
against a member of the household.”).
75 People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (citing Johnson, 644
N.E.2d at 1379).
76 See Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (“The reasons for applying the parent-child privilege
as provided in A and M were all based on the need for a young, minor child to seek guidance
and advice from his or her parents. Fitzgerald, reasoning that it was the nature of the
relationship and the nature of the communication, and not the age of the child, which must
govern, held that the need to protect that relationship into a child's adulthood continued to
outweigh the State's interest in investigating serious crimes. This court finds, contrary to
Fitzgerald, however, that once a child reaches adulthood, the nature of the relationship
between child and parent undergoes such a significant change that it no longer outweighs the
State’s interest in investigating serious crimes.”).
77 579 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
73
74
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need to share their thoughts and concerns with their
parents without fear that the disclosure will later be
compelled testimonially from their parents, has found a
limited parent-child privilege . . . . [T]he communication
here goes in the opposite direction from the
communication in the Fitzgerald case. Here it goes from
father to son. This is not the letter of the offspring
seeking guidance from parents. Indeed, Romer seeks no
guidance from the son at all. The situation is wholly
different from that presented in Fitzgerald. In short, the
letter to Kenneth Romer is not covered by the parentchild privilege as it exists in this state today.78
Outside New York, reported state decisions have uniformly
rejected recognition of any common law parent-child privilege.79
Three federal district courts, citing Fitzgerald, have recognized such
a privilege, although in the context of objections by children being

Romer, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Superior Ct., 787 P.2d 126, 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (declining to
recognize the privilege and noting that “the weight of authority is against” recognition); In re
Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the arguments for creating
such a privilege were persuasive, but “do not establish that the privilege is constitutionally
compelled or that it exists by statutory construction”); People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565, 568
(Colo. App. 1998) (declining to adopt the privilege); Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384, 386
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that Florida statute prevented the court from adopting the
privilege); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (Ill. 1983) (refusing to adopt a common
law privilege where all other state privileges are statutorily-granted); Gibbs v. State, 426
N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (declining to recognize the privilege); Cissna v. State,
352 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (same); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981)
(same); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Me. 1987) (finding no support for the
privilege in Federal or Maine Constitutions); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d
1203, 1204 (Mass. 1983) (declining to recognize the privilege); People v. Amos, 414 N.W.2d
147, 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (same); People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 340 (Miss. 1985) (distinguishing Fitzgerald); State v.
Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (declining to recognize the privilege); In re Gail
D., 525 A.2d 337, 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (declining to rule on the merits of the
privilege); In re Diana Hawkins, C.A. No. 3430, 1983 WL 4091, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11,
1983) (declining to recognize the privilege); In re Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174, 1178 (R.I. 1983)
(“[W]e do not deem this case an appropriate vehicle for the consideration of adoption of a new
privilege . . . .”); State v. Good, 417 S.E.2d 643, 644–45 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to create
a privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor); De Leon v. State, 684 S.W.2d 778, 782
(Tex. App. 1984) (declining to recognize the privilege); In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d
790, 792 (Vt. 1996) (same); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Wash. 1988) (same).
78
79
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compelled to testify against their parents.80 All other federal cases,
including all cases in the Courts of Appeals, have declined to
recognize any such privilege, either generally or on the facts
presented.81
2. Wigmore test
Even though most jurisdictions have not recognized the parentchild privilege exception, such an exception should exist under the
Wigmore test. First, like spousal communications privilege, this
article’s proposed test applies to communications that originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed. Second, confidentiality
between a parent and a child is essential to the full and satisfactory

80 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor, 949 F. Supp. 1487, 1496 (E.D.
Wash. 1996) (finding that federal law recognized a parent-child privilege under certain
circumstances); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983) (allowing child’s Catholic
faith to bar testifying against his parents for the sake of the family unit); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Greenberg), 1982 WL 597412, at *4 (D. Conn. June 25, 1982) (finding the parentchild privilege applicable in the narrow exception provided by existing religious privilege).
Two of these cases involved religious convictions against testifying. See Agosto, 553 F. Supp.
at 1326; Grand Jury Proceeding (Greenberg), 1982 WL 597412, at *4.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that no
privilege existed where father was abusing his children); In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140,
1142 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize the privilege); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir.
1993) (declining to recognize a parent-child privilege for emancipated adult children); United
States v. Harris, 852 F.2d 569, (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing no
parent-child privilege at common law); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1257–58 (6th
Cir. 1985) (refusing to extend evidentiary privilege to emancipated adult children); Port v.
Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding the denial of a parent-child privilege to not
be a violation of equal protection); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding no privilege between parents and children in criminal cases); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s
finding that the facts of the case presented no parent-child privilege); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena of Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (reaffirming Fifth Circuit
precedent that no parent-child privilege exists); In re Matthews, 714 F.2d 223, 224–25 (2d
Cir. 1983) (declining to create privilege); In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation,), 714 F.2d
347, 349 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983) (restating circuit rule that “no privilege protects a witness from
being compelled to give a grand jury evidence against his family”); United States v. Jones,
683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding no confidential communications); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511, 512–13 (5th Cir. 1981) (declining to create a parent-child
testimonial privilege); United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.
1981) (same); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); In re Three
Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389, 390 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding it well-settled law within the circuit
that there is “no general parent-child testimonial privilege”); United States v. Duran, 884 F.
Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1995) (“The general rule in most federal courts is that there is no
parent-child privilege.”); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stating that there
is “no such thing” as parent-child privilege).
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maintenance of the advisory relationship between a parent and
child, and, indeed, of the relationship between the child and his or
her attorney. Third, the advisory relationship between a parent and
a child is almost certainly one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered. Finally, it seems
obvious that effectively excluding parents from attorney-client
communications seriously impairs their ability to help their
children navigate the legal system.
Yet in the absence of legislative guidance, courts are
understandably reluctant to create broad common law testimonial
or communication-based privileges between parents and children.
First, parent-child relationships are complex and diverse—far more
so than the relationships between attorney and client, priest and
penitent, or psychotherapist and patient. Relationships between
spouses may also be complex and diverse but they, at the very least,
can signal a continuing commitment to the marriage—a
commitment marital privileges are intended to reinforce. Parents
and children do not have the same signal of continuing commitment.
It is hard to create a broad rule when the relationship that a parent
has with their child varies so much.
Second, confidentiality may not be required to ensure the “full
and satisfactory maintenance” of the parent’s advisory relationship
with the parent’s child. A child who reposes a confidence in a parent
has no assurances that the parent will not disclose that confidence
to his or her spouse, the child’s teacher, or even the police. The
converse is also true: a parent who reposes confidences in his or her
child, particularly a minor child, can never be completely certain
that the statements will remain confidential. This lack of certainty
may have nothing to do with the parent-child relationship in
question; it may simply reflect the fact that children do not always
exhibit perfect judgment. There may be contexts in which parents
and children do meet this second element of the Wigmore test;
indeed, those contexts may represent the majority of cases. The
problem is that the diversity of the real world makes it difficult for
courts to establish widely-applicable common law guidance,
especially where legislatures hesitate to codify an acceptable policy.
Nevertheless, the narrow attorney-client privilege proposed here
addresses the courts concerns. First, the parent-inclusive attorneyclient privilege proposed here does not depend on the recognition of
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any generally-applicable parent-child privilege and is more
advantageous to a broad rule covering all types of communications
between a child and his or her parent. The relationship it seeks to
protect is distinct and unique. It includes not two parties, but three:
parent, child, and the child’s attorney. By its very nature, it is
limited to cases in which there is already evidence of a strong
parent-child bond: The parent is willing to spend time, and very
often money, to help solve her child’s legal problems. And the child
affirmatively seeks her parent’s guidance and support. Before
turning to whether the expansion of attorney-client privilege to
permit the inclusion of parents is appropriate, however, this paper
will consider the attorney-client privilege and the problem of
waiver.
F. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege—“the oldest of privileges for
confidential communications”82—will generally be recognized when
“legal advice . . . is sought from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, the communication[] [is] relat[ed] to that purpose,
[and is] made in confidence by the client.”83 Thus, such
communications are immediately and, except in unusual
circumstances, permanently protected from disclosure.84 In general,
a lawyer may not reveal any information relating to the
representation without the client’s informed consent.85 Informed
consent is limited to situations in which the client gives consent only
“after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”86 A lawyer must also
“make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or

Sucharew, 66 P.3d at 64.
Aaron W. Rapier, The Role of the Attorney-Client Privilege, the Work Product Doctrine,
and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Corporate Counsel’s
Response to a Federal Grand Jury Subpoena, J. DUPAGE CTY. B. ASS’N, Dec. 2000, at 1.
84 See Fed. R. Evid. 502 (2011).
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
The attorney’s
obligation of confidentiality attaches even before the party retains the attorney—
communications by prospective clients are protected as well. Id. r. 1.18(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N
2018).
86 Id., r. 1.0(e) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
82
83
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unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information
relating to the representation of a client.”87
The attorney-client privilege is the corollary to the attorney’s
obligation of confidentiality. Both rest on three assumptions: First,
modern law can be incredibly complex to those persons attempting
to vindicate rights or comply with obligations under the law;
therefore, such persons often require assistance of counsel.88
Second, in order for a lawyer to provide effective legal advice
reflecting all of the pertinent facts, a client must feel free to disclose
all such facts to the lawyer.89 Third, clients are less likely to
“disclose personal, embarrassing, or unpleasant facts unless they
could be assured that” such facts remain confidential.90
Maintaining confidentiality “contributes to the trust that is the
hallmark of the [attorney-client] relationship.”91 A client is less
likely to disclose information to his or her lawyer, incriminating or
otherwise, if the client believes the lawyer, voluntarily or under
compulsion, may later use that information against him or her. A
lawyer not subject to obligations of confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege would likely be less effective, because the client
would not be as forthcoming with essential information. The
attorney-client privilege is therefore central to the role of attorneys
in the U.S. legal system.92
III. THE PROBLEM OF WAIVER
A. WAIVER OF COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGES GENERALLY

There are several ways in which the testimonial or confidential
communications privileges may be waived. One way is that a
communication will not be protected if third parties are present
when the communication is made.93 This is true, for example, in the
Id., r. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2018).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
92 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 189 (1995).
93 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 2336 (“Commonly, the presence of a third person within
hearing will negative [sic] a marital confidence; so too, the intended transmission of the
communication to a third person.”) (internal emphasis omitted).
87
88
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context of the marital privilege.94 Some jurisdictions have found
that the privilege is waived even if the communication was
overheard by a third party “either accidentally or by
eavesdropping.”95
Written communications are subject to the same possibility of
waiver if they come into a third party’s hands. For example, letters
between husband and wife “disclosing anything of confidential
nature are privileged ‘at least as long as they remain in the hands
of either party to the marriage.’”96 If they come into a third party’s
hands, however, the rule changes.97 In State v. Young, a defendanthusband dictated to his secretary a confidential letter for his wife.98
The third party who had taken the dictation and reduced it to
writing was permitted to testify to the contents of letter,
notwithstanding a claim of privilege.99 In the process, the third
party was allowed to refresh his memory by reviewing the letter,
and to testify that he was the person who had written the letter on
defendant’s behalf.100
Most states have enacted statutes addressing the issue of
waiver.101 For example, Maine has adopted a statute providing that
voluntarily disclosure or consent to a disclosure waives the
privilege.102
94 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (“Although marital communications
are presumed to be confidential, that presumption may be overcome by proof of facts showing
that they were not intended to be private.”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, at 753
(“The [spousal confidences] privilege applies only to communications that are confidential . .
. .”).
95 See State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 821 (N.J. 1994), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2018) (“[T]he privilege does not protect against the testimony of third
persons who have overheard (either accidentally or by eavesdropping) . . . communication
between husband and wife.” (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 82, at 303 (J.S. Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
96 Szemple, 640 A.2d at 822 (quoting 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 330 (2018)).
97 See id. at 821 (“[T]he marital-communications privilege does not apply to a written
communication between spouses that comes into the possession of a third party without the
consent of the recipient spouse.”).
98 117 A. 713, 715 (1922).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Haun, supra note 33, at 162–63 (discussing state statutes addressing the waiver
issue).
102
ME .R. EVID. 510 provides:
(a) General Rule. A person who has a privilege under these rules waives the
privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor while holding the privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of
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B. WAIVER IN THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONTEXT

The same problem of waiver arises in the attorney-client context.
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute.103 The privilege may
be lost or waived either voluntarily104 or accidentally.105 For
example, in In re Grand Jury,106 a client testified in a deposition
about financial information the client had previously communicated
to his lawyer. The lawyer was later required to testify before a grand
jury regarding this subject.107 Over the lawyer’s objections, the court
found that “where a client [voluntarily] reveals portions of her
conversation with her attorney, those revelations amount to a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the
conversation or communication about the same subject matter.”108
Consequently, the lawyer was ordered to testify.109
Since the intention of the privilege is to encourage sharing of
otherwise confidential information between client and attorney,
“conduct . . . inconsistent with this goal . . . may constitute a waiver
of the privilege.”110 Thus, as a general rule, the attorney-client
privilege is waived if the communication is made in the presence of
a third party.111 With few exceptions, this is true even if the third
party is there to provide moral support and encouragement to the
client obtaining legal advice.112 Such was the case in the People v.
Doss,113 where the court found that a third party who helped the
defendants convey important information to their attorney was

the privileged matter.
(b) Exception. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself privileged.
103 See Fed. R. Evid. 502 (2011).
104 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, at 665 (“A client who voluntarily discloses
the content of communications covered by the attorney-client privilege, or any significant part
of the content, waives the privilege.”).
105 See id. at 685 (“Courts split on the question whether accidental or inadvertent disclosure
waives the protection of attorney-client privilege.”).
106 651 N.E.2d 696, 698–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 700.
109 Id.
110 Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & W. Joseph Thesing, Jr., Confidentiality Concerns in Internal
Corporate Investigations, 25 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 48, 53 (1989).
111 See id. (“As a general rule, disclosure of confidential client information to third parties
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”).
112 See People v. Doss, 514 N.E.2d 502, 504–05 (Ill. App. 1987).
113 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

25

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 4

1016

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:991

neither the defendants’ agent or advisor; the third party’s presence
waived the attorney-client privilege.114
Courts are more lenient when the client is a minor child,
although the technical basis for such leniency is not always clear.
For example, in State v. Sucharew,115 an Arizona intermediate
appellate court held that the attorney-client privilege was not
waived when the parents of the minor client were present during
conversations with the lawyer. Noting that the parents had hired
and paid for the lawyer’s services, the court found that “[t]he clear
indication is that [the parents] were taking an understandable
parental interest and advisory role in their minor son’s legal
affair.”116 In general, however, courts do not extend this privilege to
an adult child even when the facts are the same in all respects save
the defendant’s age.117
IV. A PROPOSED PARENT-INCLUSIVE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. ROLE OF ATTORNEYS IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, AND THE
POSSIBLE ROLE OF PARENTS

Attorneys perform many roles in the U.S. legal system. First and
foremost, they serve as the client’s legal advisor. In that role, the
lawyer is not only required to provide the client with “an informed
understanding of the client’s rights and obligations,” but also to
explain the practical implications of those rights and obligations.118
As one group of scholars noted “the lawyer has a duty, as a
counselor, to become actively involved in the client’s affairs and to
advise the client in the most general sense.”119 Contrary to the
Id. at 505.
66 P.3d 59, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
116 Id.
117 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
118 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
119 Margaret Ann Wilkinson et al., Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry
into the Role of the Lawyer, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 373, 376 (1996). At least two of the ABA’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct imply that lawyers have a duty to counsel. Model Rule
1.2 states that a “lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).This implies that a lawyer has a duty to explore with the client what
the law is, how it applies to the client’s situation, and the consequences of each proposed
course of action. Model Rule 1.4 states that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
114
115
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image of the lawyer as a hired gun, “[t]he everyday practice of law
is consumed with the humane arts of counseling, negotiation,
mediation, and empathy.”120 Good lawyering is not commandcentered: “Sue my former employer!” It is rather, as some have
called it, “client-centered.”121
In addition to being a counselor to the client, the lawyer also acts
as the client’s advocate. As an advocate, the “lawyer zealously
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary
system.”122 The lawyer is also called upon to act as negotiator for the
client.123 In that capacity, the “lawyer seeks a result advantageous
to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings
with others.”124 Finally, a lawyer is a dispassionate evaluator,
required to assess the client’s legal situation without bias as
accurately as possible.125 A criminal lawyer carries an even heavier
burden because the client’s freedom, and in some cases life, are at
stake. In both the civil and criminal realms, a lawyer is required to

reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation” and that a lawyer is required to “reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished.” Id., r. 1.4(a)(2), (b). This
implies that a lawyer has a duty to explore with the client her objectives, options for
accomplishing those objectives, and the legal and non-legal consequences of each course of
action before moving forward with the representation.
120 Pearl Goldman & Leslie Larkin Cooney, Beyond Core Skills and Values: Integrating
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law into the Law School Curriculum, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 1123, 1128 (1999) (citing Rudolph J. Gerber, Legal Education and Combat
Preparedness, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 61, 69 (1989)).
121 The client-centered approach:
Presents lawyering as a coherent process, a series of behaviors and mental
habits focused on the solution of problems, both in disputes or in
transactions. Lawyering integrates law with non-legal realities, including
both conceptual and affective elements . . . . It advises preparation, prediction
and development of alternative solutions. Finally, the focus on counseling
places client decision-making at the center of lawyering.
Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV.
161, 190 (2002); see also DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH 5–8 (Thomson Reuters 3ed. 2012) (discussing justifications for the
“client-centered” approach).
122 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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convey, in an effective way, adequate information to the client so
that the client can make an informed decision.126
The difficulty of the lawyer’s task depends on many factors,
including whether the client is experienced in legal matters and in
making decisions related to those matters.127 Equally important is
the client’s level of sophistication, educational background, mental
capacity, and maturity. A lawyer must take these factors, among
others, into account when determining what information or advice
to disclose and how best to enable the client to make fully-informed
decisions.128
It is in this context that parental participation and advice are
likely to be most helpful. When the client is a young adult
inexperienced in legal matters and unaware of their potential
consequences, a parent can be a useful intermediary and secondary
counselor. Although the lawyer may best understand the law, the
parent may have better insight as to whether, when her child nods
as the lawyer speaks, the child actually understands or is merely
being agreeable. The parent may be able to suggest familiar
analogies and draw on shared experiences to help explain what
might otherwise be alien legal concepts. The parent may also help
overcome trust issues common between unsophisticated clients and
their often-intimidating lawyers. In other words, the parent may
help make the lawyer more effective, thereby enhancing the quality
of the child’s representation and the performance of the legal system
as a whole.
The Australian Juvenile Mediation Process serves as an example
of successful parental involvement in the attorney-client
relationship.129 Parental involvement there has demonstratively
been shown to helped both the victim and the offender understand

Id., r. 1.0 cmt. 6.
Id.
128 See id. (noting that lawyers should also consider whether clients are independently
represented by other counsel in determining whether consent is informed).
129 See generally, Jacqueline J. Larsen, Restorative Justice in the Australian Criminal
Justice System, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY RES. & PUB. POL’Y SERIES 147 (2014),
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/121140/rpp127/05_restorative.html.
126
127
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the fairness of outcomes and has even reduced recidivism among
participants.130
B. MODERN EXTENDED ADOLESCENCE

1. The Age of Legal Majority
The age of legal majority is the age at which an individual is
deemed competent to exercise full legal rights, such as in the civil
or political context.131 At English common law, the age of legal
majority was twenty-one for both men and women.132 Early
American jurisprudence adopted the English age of majority, which
remained largely unchanged until the twentieth century.133
The movement to lower the age of majority in the United States
began during World War II, when President Roosevelt pushed
Congress to lower the draft age from twenty-one to eighteen.134 By
the peak of the Vietnam War, the argument “old enough to fight, old
enough to vote” had become politically compelling.135 Congress
accordingly proposed and the states ratified the 26th Amendment
to the Constitution, lowering the nationwide voting age to
eighteen.136 States, for the most part, followed suit. Today, Alabama
and Nebraska treat individuals who have reached their nineteenth
130 See id. (collecting studies which examined the effectiveness of inclusive restorative
justice programs on the parties involved).
131 See Age, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “age of majority” as “[t]he
age, usually defined by statute as 18 years, at which a person attains full legal rights,
especially civil and political rights such as the right to vote”). Relatedly, the “age of capacity”
is defined as the age “at which a person is legally capable of agreeing to a contract,
maintaining a lawsuit, or the like.” Id.
132 See 1 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 927 (David S. Garland and
Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1806).
133 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 64 (2016)
(noting the evolution from the Colonial age of majority at twenty-one to eighteen following
the lowering of the draft age and other historical events).
134 See Andrew Glass, Congress Changes Draft Age, Nov. 11, 1942, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2014,
7:42
AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/this-day-in-politics-congress-draftnovember-11-1942-112752 (describing events leading to the lowering of the draft age during
World War II).
135 See Hilary Parkinson, Record of Rights Vote: “Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Vote”,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Nov. 13, 2013), https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2013/11/13/ recordsof-rights-vote-old-enough-to-fight-old-enough-to-vote (describing the ratification process of
the 26th Amendment).
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The rights of the citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen year of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of age.”).
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birthday as adults;137 in all other states, the age of legal majority is
eighteen.138 Nevertheless, most states treat a married individual as
“emancipated,” which means that the individual “assumes most
adult responsibilities” even if the individual is younger than the age
of majority.139
Lowering the age of legal majority, however, does not make
today’s eighteen-year-olds any more mature or reflect any real
changes in the pace at which they develop psychologically.140
Rather, it is a political compromise reflecting the demands our
country places on eighteen -year-olds.141 Under this view, young
adults have emerged out from under the umbrella of control of their
parents and are exposed to the freedoms and responsibilities of a
fully functioning member of society. This social transition is
stereotypically evidenced by independent living arrangements,
financial independence, and marriage. In the meantime, however,
neuroscience has moved in the opposite direction, concluding that
the human brain is not fully formed until significantly later.
2. The Neuroscience of Maturity
Recent advancements in neuroscience suggest that full
developmental maturity does not occur until well after age
eighteen.142 Magnetic resonance imaging is used to study the growth
and development of the human brain from childhood into
ALA. CODE § 26-1-1(a) (2018); NEB. REV. ST. § 43-2101 (2018).
In Wisconsin, the age of legal majority for criminal law purposes is seventeen; for all
other purposes, it is eighteen. WIS. STAT. § 990.01(3) (2017). In Mississippi, persons under the
age of twenty-one are considered minors, MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-27 (2018), but persons over
the age of eighteen maintain certain rights, such as the right to enter contracts for personal
property. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-19-13 (2018).
139 See Kathleen Michon, Emancipation of Minors, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/emancipation-of-minors-32237.html (last accessed Feb. 1, 2019). Some states,
however, have statutory minimum age, which mandates that an individual be of a certain
age before the state will legally recognize the marriage. See id. (discussing how California
requires the person being married to be at least fourteen years old).
140 See Adolescence, Brain Development, and Legal Culpability, JUV. JUST. CTR., AM. BAR
ASS’N
3
(2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf
(quoting one researcher as stating that “[t]he evidence is now strong that the brain does not
cease to mature until the early 20s. . . .”).
141 See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
142 See Adolescence, Brain Development, and Legal Culpability, supra note 140, at 3 (noting
that “we refer to those under 18 as ‘minors’ and ‘juveniles’—because, in so many respects,
they are less than adults.” (emphasis in original)).
137
138
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adulthood.143 By creating three-dimensional models to map changes
in the brain, scientists have discovered that during the teenage
years the brain experiences an intense overproduction of “gray
matter,” the brain tissue that “does the thinking.”144 Next, a period
of “pruning” takes place, “during which the brain discards gray
matter at a rapid rate.”145 This is similar to the pruning of a tree to
stimulate health and growth. The pruning process is accompanied
by “myelination, a process in which white matter,” the fatty tissue
responsible for insulating and protecting the brain, “develops.”146
Contrary to prior belief, this process, integral to the development of
the frontal cortex and advanced cognition, does not finish until well
into the twenties.147
During this pruning process, the “part of the brain that is helping
organization, planning and strategizing is not done being built
yet.”148 As Dr. Ruben C. Gur, Director of the Brain Behavior
Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, states, “[t]he
evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature until
the early twenties in those relevant parts that govern impulsivity,
judgment, planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and
other characteristics.”149 These discoveries challenge the notion that
eighteen-year-olds (or nineteen-year-olds in Alabama and
Nebraska) have the same capacity to exercise judgment and foresee
the consequences of their actions as fully developmentally mature
adults.
3. The Sociology of Maturity
Studies of demographic change suggest that modern young
adults experience a stage of significant uncertainty and insecurity
143 See id. at 1 (“[Advances in MRI technology] allow scientists to safely scan children over
many years, tracking the development of their brains.”).
144 See id. at 2; see also Elizabeth R Sowell, In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999) (“In
regions of frontal cortex, we observed reduction in gray matter between adolescence and
adulthood, probably reflecting increased myelination in peripheral regions of the cortex that
may improve cognitive processing in adulthood.”).
145 See ADOLESCENCE, supra note 140, at 2
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Inside the Teen Brain:
Interview with Jay Giedd, PBS FRONTLINE (2002),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html.
149 Declaration of Ruben C. Gur, Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002).
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after reaching the age of majority. Awareness of this intermediate
life phase has garnered much attention in the world of social science
and in mainstream media. In 2005, Time Magazine heralded a new
generation of young adults, noting that “[t]he years from 18 until 25
and even beyond have become a distinct and separate life stage, a
strange, transitional never-never land between adolescence and
adulthood” where traditional markers like marriage and financial
independence are put off.150 This new phase, described as “emerging
adulthood” by some, “is neither adolescence nor young adulthood
but is theoretically and empirically distinct from them both.”151 The
emerging adult has left the dependency of childhood and
adolescence, but has not yet fully shouldered the responsibilities of
adulthood.152 This modern trend is demonstrated by a greater
proportion of young adults continuing in school, getting married
later, bouncing from job to job, and returning home for prolonged
periods.153
The current young adult generation, sometimes known as
“millennials,” exhibit trends that demonstrate an increasingly
dependent relationship with their parents. According to the Pew
Research Center, a study conducted in 2014 found that “for the first
time in more than 130 years, adults ages 18 to 34” are more likely
to live “at home” with their parents than with a spouse or partner.154
Another Pew study, conducted in 2017, reported that millennials,
aged twenty-five to thirty-five, were more likely than previous
generations to live at home with a parent, despite rising
employment rates among this age group.155

150 Lev Grossman, Grow Up? Not So Fast, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan.
16, 2005),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1018089,00.html.
151 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2000).
152 See id. (noting that emerging adults “hav[e] not yet entered the enduring
responsibilities that are normative in adulthood”).
153 See id. at 474.
154 See Richard Fry, For First Time in Modern Era, Living with Parents Edges Out Other
Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds, PEW RES. CTR. (May 24, 2016)
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/05/24/for-first-time-in-modern-era-living-withparentsedges-out-other-living-arrangements-for-18-to-34-year-olds/.
155 Richard Fry, It’s becoming more common for young adults to live at home—and for longer
stretches, PEW RES. CTR. (May 5, 2017) http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/05/itsbecoming-more-common-for-young-adults-to-live-at-home-and-forlonger-stretches/.
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There are several explanations as to why millennials are more
frequently living with their parents. Economic factors leading to
millennials’ decision to live at home include debt, cost of living, and
the labor market.156 In addition, millennials are less likely to marry
than earlier generations, which means that they are less likely to
move in with a spouse or partner.157 Most interesting, however, is
the trend of millennial emotional dependence on the parental unit.
Studies find that young adults today, more than any previous
generation, are turning to their parents for advice and support.158
One study even suggests that adolescence lasts from ages ten to
twenty-four.159
Notably, just as the characteristics of the young adult cohort
have changed, so has the traditional relationship between adult
children and their parents. Much of this change relates to modern
young adults who remain dependent on their parents to some
degree even after leaving home. While most leave home around age
eighteen or nineteen, roughly a third return and leave again
multiple times.160 Many young adults who have left their parents’
homes remain financially dependent on their parents for several
more years.161 Some researchers have theorized that “the parental
home can be seen as a ‘safe base’ as [children] negotiate the
transitions of early adulthood.”162 Thus, the premise that at age
eighteen adults become fully independent and less reliant on the
counsel of their parents ignores modern reality.163
Id.
Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americanshave-never-married/.
158 See Samantha Raphelson, Some Millennials—And Their Parents—Are Slow to Cut the
Cord, NPR (Oct. 21, 2014 6:40 AM) https://www.npr.org/2014/10/21/356951640/somemillennials-and-their-parents-are-slow-to-cut-the-cord.
159 See Kate Silver, Adolescence now lasts from 10 to 24, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-42732442 (discussing a recent study in the Lancet Child &
Adolescent Health journal).
160 See id.; Barasch Gitelson & Dana McDermott, Parents and Their Young Adult Children:
Transitions to Adulthood, 85 CHILD WELFARE 853, 857 (2005).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 While many people argue this appears to reflect a quality of laziness or entitlement, the
delay of responsibility may be due in fact to a healthy cynicism and a more serious approach
to life. See Grossman, supra note 150 (noting that multiple scientists have rejected the
argument that young adults are lazy, and instead posit that “they’re reaping the fruit of
decades of American affluence and social liberation.”).
156
157
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Equally compelling are studies of modern young adults’
conceptions of themselves, which now indicate that those
characteristics of parent-child relationships, once assumed to
disappear at adulthood, continue for several years after the
transition. Developmental psychologist Jeffrey Arnett, for example,
examined how young people themselves view the transition into
adulthood.164 When asked whether they considered themselves to be
adults, only sixty-three percentage of twenty-one to twenty-four
year-olds answered “yes.”165 Others have found that among the
millennial generation, there exists an “unprecedented” closeness
between millennials and their parents.166 Relationships between
parents and their adult children have become stronger, not weaker.
These sociological trends, fully consistent with the findings of
developmental psychology, are reflected across both law and
business practice. Adult children between ages eighteen and
twenty-one face restrictions on the ability to purchase and consume
alcohol. The Uniform Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 allowed
the federal government to withhold a percentage of federal highway
funds from any state that permitted lawful purchase or possession
of an alcoholic beverage by persons under twenty-one.167 This
statute reflected Congress’ legislative judgment that individuals in
that age range have less ability to exercise sound judgment in their
alcohol consumption decisions. According to the Center for Disease
Control, consumption of alcohol by those under twenty-one years of
age is “strongly linked” to alcohol poisoning-related deaths, motor
vehicle accidents caused by driving under the influence, suicide,
violence, “changes in brain development,” school performance
difficulties, and “alcohol dependency later in life.”168 The current
minimum drinking age of twenty-one is not, however, evidence that
individuals above that age but still within their early twenties have

164 See generally Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone: The Contemporary
American Transition to Adulthood in Cultural and Historical Context, 41 HUM. DEV. 295
(1998).
165 Id. at 304.
166 Raphelson, supra note 158.
167 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(A) (2012).
168 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FACT SHEETS – AGE 21 MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE,
https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm (last visited Oct.
29 2018).
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better judgment; it reflects rather the political difficulties of setting
the drinking age limit any higher.
Car insurance and car rental companies recognize that those
below the age of twenty-five do not have the same capacity for
foresight and judgment as older adults. Car insurance premiums
decrease significantly once a driver turns twenty-five years old.169
Most car rental companies either do not rent to or add a surcharge
for drivers under twenty-five years old.170 These restrictions are not
arbitrary—those under twenty-five are higher risk drivers and more
likely to have accidents.171
Similarly, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) allows adult children
up to age twenty-six to remain on health insurance plans owned by
a parent, reflecting the modern reality that many young adults are
not able to acquire their own health insurance plans at age eighteen,
notwithstanding their typically excellent actuarial profiles.172 Prior
to the ACA’s protection, young adults had the highest uninsured
rate of any age group,173 consistent with sociological evidence that
this cohort is less prepared to be self-sufficient than its
predecessors.
All of this means that today’s young adults may be less
developmentally mature, independent, and experienced in the ways
of the world than the law stereotypically assumes. A significant
number of their cohort still rely on advice from their parents in
many areas of life. Lawyers should be encouraged to allow these
young adults to consult with their parents and listen to their advice.
When adult children wish to rely on their parents advice, lawyers

169 How
Age
Affects
Auto
Insurance
Rates,
DMV.ORG,
https://www.dmv.org/insurance/how-age-affects-auto-insurance-rates.php (last visited Oct.
29, 2018).
170 William Lipovsky, Rent a Car at Age 18: Here’s Who Will Rent to You, FIRST QUARTER
FIN. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://firstquarterfinance.com/rent-a-car-at-age-18/.
171 See Auto Insurance Rates, supra note 169; see also Emergency Department Visits for
Motor Vehicle Traffic Injuries: United States, 2010–2011, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES DATA BRIEF (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db185.htm (noting
that “the emergency department visit rate for motor vehicle traffic injuries was highest
among persons aged 16–24 years”).
172 Young Adults and the Affordable Care Act: Protecting Young Adults and Eliminating
Burdens on Families and Businesses, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/adult_child_fact_sheet.html (last accessed Oct.
28, 2018).
173 Id.
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should be able to include parents in counseling and decision-making
conferences.
C. THE CASE FOR A PARENT-INCLUSIVE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Under this paper’s proposed new rule, inclusion of a client’s
parent in attorney-client meetings in an advisory capacity,
disclosure to a client’s parent of attorney-client communications,
and discussion between parent and child of the contents of such
communications should not be treated as waiving the attorneyclient privilege—so long as the relevant communications are not
disclosed to anyone else. The Wigmore test requires that, to be
privileged, communications must meet four conditions: (1) the
communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.174 As explored in Part II supra, the parentchild relationship, like other important relationships, should be
protected under this test.
1. Rule applied to minor children
In the case of a minor child, the proposal solves an important
practical problem. As a practical matter, parents often need to be
present at any meeting between their minor child and that child’s
attorney. Although treating the parent as an agent may mitigate
this issue somewhat, it is not always a fully satisfactory solution. 175
As will be discussed more fully in Section IV below, treating a
parent as the child’s agents is not always fully satisfactory. In the
context of a client who is a minor child, the proposed rule easily
meets the Wigmore test.
First, communications made in the course of attorney-client
meetings clearly “originate in a confidence that they will not be
174 See supra Part II. JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 8, § 8
(Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
175 See infra Part IV.
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disclosed,”176 as do attorney-client communications disclosed to the
client’s parent. With appropriate cautionary warnings from the
attorney, any discussion between parent and child of the contents
of such communications should also meet the confidentiality
requirement.
Second, confidentiality is clearly essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the attorney-client relationship. If the
client’s parents are to participate in an advisory capacity,
confidentiality is equally essential to their participation. (3)
Third, the advisory relationship between parent and child is “one
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.”177 Indeed, parental guidance on matters of import to the
child is often required by law as part of a parent’s duty of support.
It is undisputed that “[t]he law requires of parents that they provide
care, maintenance and guidance for their unemancipated minor
child.”178 To require that parents provide such guidance, but impose
as a penalty loss of the attorney-client privilege if they do, would
seem a cruel joke.
Finally, a rule that requires loss of the attorney-client privilege
if confidential information is disclosed to the client’s parents
wreacks substantial injury to both the attorney-client relationship
and the parent-child’s advisory relationship. The resulting
informational benefits to the finder of fact are ephemeral; any such
rule is likely to result in such confidential information not being
disclosed to the client’s parents in the first place.
In sum, this paper’s proposed rule should clearly be recognized—
with respect to inclusion of parents of minor children within the
attorney-client privilege—when such parents participate in their
child’s confidential attorney-client communications in an advisory
capacity.
2. Rule applied to non-minor children
The harder question is whether the proposed privilege should
disappear when the child reaches the age of majority. In essence, it
must be determined whether it is the case, as the Hilligas court
asserted in declining to follow Fitzgerald, that “once a child reaches
176
177
178

Wigmore, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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adulthood, the nature of the relationship between child and parent
undergoes such a significant change that it no longer outweighs the
State’s interest in investigating serious crimes.”179
One major problem is that the legal age of majority is not defined
solely by reference to an individual’s ability to make fully informed
adult decisions. Historically, it has also reflected considerations
having nothing to do with emotional or judgmental maturity. As has
been noted, for example, about half of all states have no absolute
minimum age for marriage, and married individuals are by law
emancipated adults.180 According to data compiled by Unchained at
Last, an advocacy group opposed to child marriage, within the past
fifteen years over 200,000 minors married within the United
States.181 The youngest were three girls age ten and one boy age
eleven. 182 If so many children can become emancipated adults by
way of marriage, the age of majority must not necessarily indicate
an individual’s ability to make an informed decision.
It is not as though on our eighteenth or twenty-first birthday, or
upon being married at some younger age, we become magically
endowed with the level of judgment and sophistication necessary to
make sound adult decisions. Yet current attorney-client privilege
law must somehow contends this to be true. The issue is especially
troublesome in the area of criminal law, where clients must often
make life-altering choices. Obviously, it is the responsibility of the
lawyer to advise the client of available options and make
recommendations as to which path is best.183 A young adult, even if
emancipated, may still benefit from the advice of a trusted parent

People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
181 Chris Baynes, More than 200,000 children married in US over the last 15 years,
INDEPENDENT, (July 8, 2017 3:29 PM), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/200000-children-married-us-15-years-child-marriage-child-bridesnew-jersey-chris-christie-a7830266.html. The youngest were three girls age ten and one boy
age eleven. Id.
182 Id.
183 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[A] lawyer shall . .
. consult with the client as to the means by which [the objectives of the representation] are to
be pursued.”); id. r. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
179
180
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to help make mature and fully considered decisions.184 For the
parent to offer an emancipated child informed advice, the parent
needs to be present at the relevant attorney-client meetings and
privy to the lawyer’s confidential advice.185
Herein lies the rub. Under current law, the presence of the
parent during such confidential meetings or the disclosure to the
parent of such confidential communications may waive the
attorney-client privilege, and may even subject the parent to a
subpoena to testify at trial against his or her own child.186 Imagine
a girl married at age ten who, at age thirteen, wants a divorce
because her husband is beating her. Can her mother attend
meetings with the child’s attorney without jeopardizing the
attorney-client privilege? Not under current law.
From a prosecutor’s standpoint, compelling the parent to testify
against a child may seem an easy way to prove a case. The parent,
however, faces an impossible dilemma.187 Should the parent comply,
destroy the child’s life, and sever the family relationships built over
a lifetime she has spent her life building?188 Refuse and go to jail for
contempt?189 Lie and face perjury charges?190 In one case, an adultchild witness placed in a similar quandary contemplated suicide as
the cleanest way out, chose to testify against his parent, and then
was ostracized from his community for so doing.191 In the long run,
184 See Franklin, supra note 4, at 151 (“The parent, for example, often must serve as the
child’s legal advisor, spiritual counselor, and physical and emotional health expert.”).
185 See id. (“The necessity for confidentiality is comparable to that within the professional
relationships . . . . Parents must establish an atmosphere of trust to facilitate free and open
communication.”).
186 See, e.g., People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (“The People’s
motion to compel defendant’s mother to answer questions before the Grand Jury concerning
conversations she had with defendant relating to the alleged homicide for which he was
arrested is granted.”). One of the most famous examples of this occurred in February 1998,
when Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky’s mother, Marcia
Lewis, to testify before a grand jury about her daughter’s confessions to her regarding her
relationship with then-President Clinton. See John M. Broder, Monica Lewinsky’s Mother
Fails
in
Bid
to
End
Testimony,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/26/us/monica-lewinsky-s-mother-fails-in-bid-toendtestimony.html.
187 See Franklin, supra note 4, at 169 (noting that “[a] parent confronted with the
government’s demand for [] testimony” has three inadequate options).
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1256 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985).
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of course, parents will simply be excluded from the confidential
advice given by a child’s attorney, and prosecutors will have to go
back to proving their cases the old-fashioned way. From society’s
perspective, where the parent has done what we expect good
parents to do—retained an attorney for his or her child and
participated in an advisory capacity in the resolution of the child’s
legal problems—this seems profoundly counterproductive.192
It may be objected that the most likely course of events is that
the child will first consult his or her parents and that only then will
an attorney become involved and attorney-client privilege attach.
There are two solutions, both consistent with this paper’s proposed
rule. First, a court might hold that parent-child communications
prior to retention of the attorney are not privileged unless the
jurisdiction separately recognizes a parent-child communication
privilege. Such a holding would still allow the parent to participate
in the child’s attorney-client meetings and be privy to the child’s
attorney-client confidential communications.
Alternatively, a court might hold that so long as the family
promptly retains legal counsel, the parent-inclusive attorney-client
privilege relates back to and includes the parent-child
communications that led to the retention of legal counsel. Current
law already applies attorney-client privilege to communications by
prospective clients and thus already covers communications prior to
creation of the attorney-client relationship.193
1. Should there be an age limit?
Finally, there is the question of whether the proposed rule
should include an age limit—that is, whether, for example, it should
only be available if the child is age twenty-five or younger.
Neuroscience and sociology both suggest a particular need for
continued parental participation and advice past age eighteen, up
through some time in the mid-twenties.194 Such an age-limited rule
192 See Franklin, supra note 4, at 168–69 (recognizing the parent-child relationship as one
that society has an interest in protecting).
193 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (recognizing an
attorney’s duties to a prospective client prior to the formation of an attorney-client
relationship).
194 See supra Part IV.C; see also Karen Fingerman, The Ascension of Parent-Offspring Ties,
29 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 114, 117 (Feb. 2016), https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume29/february/ascension-parent-offspring-ties (concluding that “parent-child ties typically are
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would go a long way towards solving the problem this proposed rule
seeks to solve.
It is, however, unclear that any such age limit is needed. Parents
of thirty-year-olds are far less likely to become involved in their
children’s legal affairs.195 If they do choose to become so are
involved, it is probably because of the seriousness of their child’s
problems, the strength of the particular parent-child bond, a
perceived inability of the adult child adequately to handle his or her
own affairs without parental assistance, or a combination of the the
foregoing. In such cases, the rule proposed by this paper might still
be warranted. In other words, a parent-inclusive attorney-client
privilege might may be self-limiting as a practical matter even
without an age limit, and an age limit might well preclude its
application to cases—expected to be rare—in which it ought to
apply.
V. PARENT AS AGENT
An alternative possible solution to the problem addressed here—
–that of allowing parents to help their children navigate a
sometimes hostile legal system—would be to treat the parent as an
agent for the child, whether adult or minor. The parent-as-agent
solution encounters significant problems that this paper’s proposed
rule avoids. Before explaining why the parent-inclusive attorneyclient privilege is preferable, I will discuss why the parent-as-agent
solution has garnered support.
A. SUPPORT FOR A PARENT-AS-AGENT SOLUTION

Some jurisdictions already recognize an expanded attorneyclient privilege that includes both agents of the lawyer and agents
of the client “necessary” to the representation of the client.196 Other
highly involved, functional and serve as sources of support” and that these ties are “highly
rewarding”). But see Franklin, supra note 4, at 171 (“As children grow older, they develop
more associations. Although these outside contacts may never supplant entirely relationships
with their parents, the parents’ role as the primary shaping force in the children’s lives
ends.”).
195 See Franklin, supra note 4 at 170 (noting that “an adult’s need for parental guidance”
is less than a child’s because an adult “can seek professional aid directly”).
196 See Michael H. Berger, Preservation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Using Agents and
Intermediaries to Obtain Legal Advice, COLO. LAW., May 2001, at 51 (examining “under what
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jurisdictions extend the privilege to any third party who serves as a
“facilitator” and is therefore “essential or necessary for the client to
obtain legal advice.”197 The two approaches appear to merge in § 70
of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which
states that “[a] person is a confidential agent for communication if
the person’s participation is reasonably necessary to facilitate the
client’s communication with a lawyer . . . and if the client reasonably
believes that the person will hold the communication in
confidence.”198 According to the Restatement, in determining
whether a third person is an agent or facilitator, courts will look at
various factors including: (1) “the customary relationship between
the client and the asserted agent”; (2) “the nature of the
communication”; and (3) “the client’s need for the third person’s
presence to communicate effectively with the lawyer or to
understand and act upon the lawyer’s advice.”199
If we treat parents as agents for their children, therefore, their
participation in attorney-client communications may be treated as
participation on behalf of their principals. This should not waive the
attorney-client privilege any more than participation by a corporate
agent waives the corporation’s attorney-client privilege.
California’s attorney-client privilege, for example, extends to
persons “who are present to further the interest of the client in the
consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer is consulted.”200 Similarly, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dictum, that “[t]he
presence of certain third parties . . . who are agents . . . of an
attorney or the client, and who are necessary to the consultation,
will not destroy [the attorney-client privilege.]”201 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has likewise noted that the attorney-client privilege
exists even if a third person is present, so long as the third person’s

circumstances an individual may involve non-attorney advisors in the attorney-client
relationship without waiving the privilege”).
197 Id.
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
199 Id.
200 CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West2003).
201 State v. Gordon, 504 A.2d 1020, 1025 (Conn. 1985).
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presence was reasonably necessary for transmission of the
communication.202
An agent is “[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or in place of
another.”203 Although minor children rarely consciously designate
their parents to act as agents, the law nevertheless treats parents
as their children’s agents for many purposes. Arguably, treating a
parent as her child’s agent for attorney-client privilege purposes
should be an easy step. Under this logic, a parent’s participation as
an agent in confidential attorney-client communications, therefore,
should not waive the attorney-client privilege. This was the case in
Gerheiser v. Stephens, for example, where the court found that the
defendant’s mother’s conversation with her minor child’s lawyer
was protected by the privilege.204 The court stated that the mother
was acting as the agent of the minor child in procuring legal
representation.205
The agent may also provide support. The Restatement also states
that “[a]n agent for communication need not take a direct part in
client-lawyer communications, but may be present because of the
Client’s psychological or other need.”206 A parent’s role may be as
small as providing emotional support or as large as helping her child
make decisions that will affect the rest of his or her life.
Additionally, parents may make the attorney-client relationship
more effective in at least two ways. First, they may be able to
facilitate communications between their children and their
children’s attorney. Setting aside language and cultural differences,
which arise in a minority of situations, a parent may be aware of
gaps in the child’s linguistic or comprehension skills that are not
apparent to others. The parent’s active participation may facilitate
conveyance of information necessary to allow the child to make
informed decisions.
202 See Walling v. Walling (In re Guardianship of Walling), 727 P.2d 586, 592 (Okla. 1986)
(finding that although the law permits the privilege to extend to third parties reasonably
necessary for communication, the communication at issue was not privileged).
203 Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
204 Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“As a
preliminary matter, we agree with the trial court that Gerheiser’s conversation with
Brabham was protected by the attorney-client privilege, as she was acting as an agent for her
son for the purpose of securing legal representation for him.”).
205 Id.
206 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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Second, a parent is more likely to share an ongoing, trusting
relationship with the child than the child’s lawyer. Acting as the
child’s agent, the parent may be able to assist both lawyer and child
by persuading the latter to adopt the lawyer’s suggested course of
action when the lawyer is unable to do so. Trust plays a vital role to
ensure that a lawyer provides the client with effective
representation. Therefore, a parent who encourages the child to
trust the lawyer more will similarly provide a vital role in ensuring
the lawyer can effectively represent the client.
B. PROBLEMS WITH A PARENT-AS-AGENT SOLUTION

There are, however, four problems with the parent-as-agent
solution.
1. Judicial Reluctance to Treat Parents as Agents of Adult Children
First, courts have been reluctant to treat parents as agents of
their adult children for attorney-client privilege purposes.207
Although courts have been relatively comfortable treating parents
as agents for their minor children, they have generally not been
willing to extend such an agency or facilitation theory to parents of
adult children.208 When a child reaches the age of majority, he or
she (at least in contemplation of the law) no longer needs anyone to
act on his or her behalf.209 Courts have consistently held that adult
children are expected to have the requisite capacity for effective
communication; thus, it no longer seems appropriate or necessary
for parents to act as an agent or facilitator for the adult child.

207 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 395 S.E.2d 73, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an adult
burglary defendant’s mother and sister’s eavesdropping on the defendant’s communications
with attorney in which he admitted to committing the charged crime revoked the attorney–
client privilege); State v. Fingers, 564 S.W.2d 579, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the
presence of an adult criminal defendant’s father during a conference constituted waiver of
the attorney-client privilege).
208 See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications Made in Presence of or Solely to or by Family Members or Companion,
Confidant, or Friend of Attorneys or Client or Attesting Witnesses for Client’s Will, 67 A.L.R.
6th 341, § 7 (2011) (detailing various instances of courts eliminating attorney-client privilege
because of a parent’s involvement in the communication).
209 See, e.g., 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 1 (2018) (“Majority is the age at which the disabilities
of infancy are removed, and hence, a person who has reached his or her majority is entitled
to the management of his or her own affairs and to the enjoyment of civic rights.”).
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Treating parents as agents of their adult children also
exacerbates a scope of agency problem that seems easier to ignore
in the case of minor children—the determination of circumstances
where parents should properly be treated as agents of their adult
children. Normally, when we deliver information to an agent, we
have, in contemplation of the law, delivered it to the agent’s
principal.210
When a lawyer delivers information to client’s parent, should the
lawyer then be treated as having discharged any obligations to the
client? Agents have the power make decisions on behalf of their
principals within the scope of their agency.211 In what situations can
parents make decisions on behalf of their adult children? This
problem may even be problematic in the case of minor children. Can
a parent accept a plea bargain offer on behalf of a 17-year-old child?
The scope of any agency depends on the agreement and conduct of
the various parties. There is no one-size-fits-all answer to the
question of scope. Once we begin using a parent-as-agent solution,
even for minor children, we risk opening a Pandora’s box.
2. Potential Overbreadth: The Right of Principals to Choose Their
Own Agents
Second, principals normally have the right to choose their own
agents.212 If courts use agency law to admit parents to attorneyclient communications without finding waiver, it is not clear why
they should not then also admit the client’s sister or best friend on
the same agency theory.
If we use a parent-as-agent solution, the next case may well
involve a client who tells her lawyer or the court: “This is my BFF.
She’s the smartest person I know. If anyone can understand what’s
going on, she will. I always rely on her advice. I’d really like her to
210 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“A notification given
to an agent is effective as notice to the principal if the agent has actual or apparent authority
to receive the notification, unless the person who gives the notification knows or has reason
to know that the agent is acting adversely to the principal . . . .”).
211 See id. § 2.02 (“An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied in the
principal’s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the
principal’s objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal’s manifestations and
objectives when the agent determines how to act.”).
212 See id. § 3.01 (“Actual authority [of an agent] is created by a principal’s manifestation
to an agent that, as reasonably understood by the agent, expresses the principal’s assent that
the agent take action on the principal’s behalf.”).
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sit in on my meeting with my lawyer.” For many courts, this would
be a step too far. Yet it follows, seemingly inevitably, from a parentas-agent solution, where its rationale has potential to expand to
other types of “agent” viewed relationships. One key virtue of the
proposed parent-inclusive attorney-client privilege rule is that it is
limited by its terms to parents.
3. Potential Under breadth: The Subsequent Discussion Problem
Third, a parent-as-agent solution does not privilege the
discussions that a parent and child will inevitably have after their
meeting with the lawyer. This solution does not appear to protect
subsequent discussions between principal (the client) and agent
(the parent). If those discussions are discoverable, the whole
purpose of admitting the parent to the attorney-client meeting in
the first place is defeated.
If our purpose is to structure the attorney-client privilege so as
to allow parents to help their children work through their legal
problems, we should expect—indeed, encourage—parents and their
children to discuss the issues raised at the attorney-client meeting
after the meeting is over. The proposed rule would extend the
privilege to such discussions so long as the relevant communications
are not disclosed to anyone else. It defeats the purpose of any such
solution to hold that parent and child waive the privilege if they
continue to talk about what went on at the meeting after they leave.
Yet a parent-as-agent solution implies that continuing discussions
would be legally problematic.
4. Collateral Consequences of Modifying Existing Agency Law
Finally, many jurisdictions have well-settled rules applying
agency law to attorney-client communications that are not limited
to parent-child agency.213 Modifying the law governing application
of the attorney-client privilege to agents or facilitators may have
collateral consequences beyond the parent-child context. Upending
those generally-applicable rules to permit a parent-as-agent
solution to the problem addressed here may be a price some courts
are unwilling to pay.
213 See generally ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW HIGHLIGHTS, Westlaw (database
updated May 2018) (providing a state survey of statutes and caselaw controlling attorneyclient privilege).
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Some jurisdictions, for example, appear to be comfortable
extending the attorney-client privilege to agents of the attorney, but
less comfortable extending it to agents of the client.214 Covered
agents of the lawyer might include the lawyer’s secretaries,
paralegals, legal assistants, stenographers, and clerks.215 In Miller
v. District Court, for example, a psychiatrist was retained to assist
defense counsel in a criminal matter by examining the defendant.216
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of impaired
mental condition.217 The prosecution learned about the defendant’s
examination and subpoenaed the psychiatrist as a witness.218 The
Colorado Supreme Court ordered the trial court to quash the
contempt citation issued when the psychiatrist refused to testify
regarding his communications with the defendant.219 The Court
explained its holding by stating that “[t]he agency rule recognizes
that the complexities of practice prevent attorneys from effectively
handling clients’ affairs without the help of others. The assistance
of these agents ‘being indispensable . . . the privilege must include
all persons who act as the attorney’s agents.’”220 Similarly, in United
States v. Kovel, the court found that the attorney-client privilege
was protected where an accountant was employed by the lawyer and
participated in the attorney-client communication at the request of
the lawyer.221
Some states, however, narrowly construe agency or facilitation
statutes to apply only to corporations or other entities inherently
incapable of communication other than through agents.222 It is also
telling that in neither Miller nor Kovel did the court’s rationale
appear to extend to agents of the client. Additionally, at least one

214 See Berger, supra note 196 at 52 (reasoning that Colorado probably would not extend
attorney-client privilege to agents of the client).
215 Id.
216 Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 835 (Colo. 1987), superseded by statute, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987), as recognized in Gray v. District Court, 884 P.2d 286, 290–91
(Colo. 1994).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 836, 840.
220 Id. at 838 (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2301 (1961)).
221 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961).
222 See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 841 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (reasoning that privilege must apply to lower level employees within a company in
certain circumstances).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

47

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 4

1038

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:991

other court has found that the presence of an accountant during the
lawyer-client consultation destroyed the privilege.223 Treating the
client’s parent as the attorney’s agent, however, would further
complicate existing agency law. For all of the foregoing reasons, the
solution urged by this paper seems superior to a parent-as-agent
solution. Even the latter, however, would likely be a better solution
than none.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a rule that inclusion of a client’s parent in
attorney-client meetings in an advisory capacity, disclosure to
client’s parent of attorney-client communications, and discussion
between parent and child of the contents of such communications
should not be treated as waiving the attorney-client privilege, so
long as the relevant communications are not disclosed to anyone
else. Such a rule is supported by both the state of modern
adolescence and by the Wigmore test. Expanding the attorney-client
privilege in this limited way to make it parent-inclusive would allow
parents to help their children negotiate the legal system without
requiring creation of any separate parent-child privilege.
If Jane, the eighteen-year-old college freshman whose story
introduces this paper, were to live in a jurisdiction that has adopted
this proposed rule, when her mother arrives the following day, they
can both meet with Jane’s attorney. Privy to the attorney’s advice,
Jane’s mother can help her more effectively cope with the trying
weeks and months to come, providing informed support as Jane
attempts to negotiate the difficult, painful issues raised by the
sexual assault to which she has been subject. The jurisdiction will
have made its legal system more effectively accessible to those we
most want to help.
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